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Determinants of Export Growth in Transition Economy Firms:
Institutions, Aspirations, Incentives, and Inertia

ABSTRACT
Exports are an important source of revenue, especially in transitional economies. To better understand
export growth, we examine the influence of institutional development, managerial aspirations, private
ownership, firm size, and age with a sample of Central and East European firms. We find that institutions
affect export growth through their interaction with firm size and age, though in opposite ways. Also, while the
impact of private ownership is conditional on the level of institutional development, managerial aspirations
support export growth across all institutional environments examined. These results indicate the importance of
institutions and their limits when behavioral factors are considered.
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INTRODUCTION
Exports are an increasingly important source of firm growth. They provide the firm with additional
sources of revenue and profit beyond the home market. The importance of foreign markets is particularly acute
in changing institutional environments, as established market relationships can be adversely affected (Aulakh,
Kotabe, & Teegen, 2000; Svejnar, 2002). This effect occurs because institutions influence the formal and
informal rules by which firms operate through legal, political, economic, social, and cultural codes of conduct
(Makino, Isobe, & Chan, 2004; Meyer & Peng, 2005; North, 1990; Oliver, 1997). At the intersection of
institutions and the firm, research has considered the impact of institutions on many firm characteristics such
as group membership (Khanna & Palepu, 2000), ownership (Filatotchev, Buck, & Zhukov, 2000; Roth &
Kostova, 2003), market share (Makino et al., 2004), networks (Peng & Heath, 1996), and size (Filatotchev,
Dyomina, Wright, & Buck, 2001; Park & Luo, 2001). Missing from this work is an understanding of the
impact of institutional forces on managerial and firm level factors that influence export growth, especially in
the context of transitional economies.
Our work addresses this gap in current research by integrating institutional, behavioral, and inertia
theories to understand how the institutional environment directly and indirectly may help or hinder the export
growth of firms. This approach allows us to consider not whether institutions matter, but how they matter with
respect to export growth. We predict that greater levels of institutional development, as reflected by the degree
of freemarket institutions in place, will lead to higher export growth. We build from this prediction by
examining the direct impact of managerial aspirations, private ownership, firm size, and age on export growth.
For each of these variables, we also develop moderating relationships with institutional development and the
resulting impact on export growth. To test our hypotheses, we use a unique dataset of over 470 Central and
East European (CEE) firms from four transitional economy countries: Belarus, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and
Ukraine. This context provides the setting for a natural experiment, with the sample cutting across industries
and founding periods. Most notably, we use the difference in the pace of transition across our studied
countries to analyze the impact of institutions.
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The primary variables of interest are connected by their influence on a firm’s ability to undertake change.
The change that we consider is the increase in a firm’s exports. We focus on export growth for two reasons.
The first reason is that export growth requires a change from a firm’s current operations and entails a degree
of uncertainty. Starting and then increasing exports were a major challenge of CEE firms; prior to the
transition, international sales were often accomplished through stateowned foreign trade companies. As
governments began to transition and eliminate export agencies, firms gained the right to export directly
(Filatotchev et al., 2001). This opened the possibility for firmlevel choices regarding exports. The second
reason to consider export growth relates to the drop in domestic demand in transitional economies following
the economic restructuring of the 1990s. This drop meant that foreign revenue became an important priority
for firms in transitional economies (Filatotchev et al., 2001; Svejnar, 2002). Although there are different ways
to increase foreign revenue, we focus on exports, as they are considered to be the first stage of
internationalization (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) and are expected to be relevant to a broader segment of the
economy. Expected benefits from this step include increased sales revenue, scale advantage, scope advantage,
increased market coverage, and opportunity to build marketbased capabilities (Aulakh et al., 2000; Bilkey,
1978; Cavusgil & Nevin, 1981; Peng, 2003). Thus, given increased freemarket incentives and opportunities
for growth and decreased local market demand, export business growth was widely viewed as an important
goal for many CEE firms (Filatotchev et al., 2001; Peng & Heath, 1996).
The results of our study indicate that institutions do not directly impact firms’ export growth levels.
Rather, the impact of institutions is through their interaction with the inertia factors of firm size and age. In
moredeveloped institutional environments, size becomes a liability and age becomes an asset in achieving
export growth for firms with export experience. The influence of private ownership was also conditional on
institutional development levels and existence of previous export experience. These relationships change for
firms without export experience. Managerial aspirations supported export growth across our range of
institutional development levels, suggesting management can influence firm performance even in less
developed institutional environments.
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We believe these results offer three contributions to our understanding of export growth. First,
institutions do impact export growth, but not directly. Rather, they are influential when interacted with firm
age and with firm size indicating an institutionalfirm level effect on export growth. Second, the opposite
impact of firm age and firm size on export growth indicates support for Peng’s (2003) proposed phasedmodel
of institutional transition regarding institutional evolution from relationshipbased to rulebased structures. In
particular, age and size can send different signals to foreign buyers concerning the viability of the domestic
firm as a trading partner. Third, our results suggest that even in lessdeveloped economies, managerial
aspirations do impact export growth. This result highlights the possible limits on institutions in influencing
managerial behavior. These three contributions highlight the continued need to consider how expected
relationships may change in lessdeveloped institutional contexts. They are steps toward addressing the need
cited by Oliver (1997) of examining the impact of institutions on managerial decisions, as well as
understanding the internationalization of emerging economy firms (Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng;
2005).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section provides the context and theoretical
framework to develop five hypotheses. We then review the data and methods to test the hypotheses followed
by our presentation and discussion of the results. The paper closes with some limitations of the study and
suggestions for future research.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In this section, we develop hypotheses that predict that the institutional development level, managerial
aspirations, and private ownership will be positively related to export growth. Furthermore, we predict that
size will be curvilinearly related, whereas age will be negatively related to export growth. We expect the
predicted relationships to be weakened in an environment with lessdeveloped institutions.
There is a broad literature investigating factors that impact exports and export growth (Cavusgil, & Zou,
1994; Ito, 1997; Lages, Jap, & Griffith, 2008; Mascarenthas, 1986). In this paper, we focus on two
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behavioral factors that can overcome barriers associated with export growth. These two factors, aspirations
and private ownership, can help the firm increase its export levels. In our model, private ownership represents
managerial incentives and control, which are expected to be important as firms transition from Communist
controlled to freemarket economies. We use two other variables, age and size, to capture the degree of inertia
in the firm. Inertia makes it more difficult for a firm to change from past practices. For firms trying to increase
export levels, inertia may magnify the barriers managers face. Beyond the direct effects of these four
variables, we further consider how the institutional development level may interact to either increase or
dampen their effect. Using these different theoretical frameworks allows us to develop a model that captures
previously ignored behavioral and inertia variables that affect export growth. Figure 1 summarizes the
predicted relationships with export growth as our dependent variable. We begin by considering the effect of
the level of institutional development.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]

Level of Institutional Development
In our research, the fundamentals of institutional theory are that institutions create the basis for firm
economic activities such as production, exchange, and distribution – in this way they set the ‘rules of the
game’ (North, 1990; Park & Luo, 2001) – and that firms’ strategic decisions are facilitated or
constrained by institutions (Oliver, 1997; Child & Tsai, 2005; Peng & Heath, 1996). “The major
differences among nations in economic performance largely are due to differences in their institutions … in
some countries they have evolved in a way that is favorable to economic progress and in other countries not,”
states Nelson (1995:82) in discussing the position of Douglass C. North regarding the evolution of economic
institutions. It is generally agreed that the effects of the actions of the firm are highly dependent on the
institutional environment in which they occur (Douma et al., 2006; Park & Luo, 2001; Peng & Heath, 1996).
In considering the impact of the institutional framework, we focus on the degree to which institutions support a
freemarket economy. Institutional development includes enhancements in trade policy, property rights,
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reduced corruption, reduced government regulation, and other economic aspects of efficient freemarkets
(Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000; Peng & Heath, 1996). In this way, the role of developed institutions is to
provide a level playing field for an efficient, market based economy. Therefore, the greater the degree to
which institutions support a freemarket economy, the greater we consider the country’s level of freemarket
institutional development, which for brevity, we will call the level of institutional development.
We next consider the particular reasons why the level of institutional development affects export growth.
North (1990: 56) states that, “institutions affect performance of the economy by their effect on the costs of
exchange and production.” We follow this Northian perspective, as we are interested in the impact of
institutions upon firm behavior. We acknowledge that researchers studying the evolution of institutional
arrangements have indicated that, in a dynamic interaction process, firms may affect institutions, and
intuitions may affect firms. (Chiaburu, 2006; Seo & Creed, 2002). Our interest, though, is with the impact of
institutions on firms. In particular, we are interested in how higher institutional development reduces the
average costs of exchange, and enables exchange with foreign customers. First, the move towards freemarket
institutional frameworks opens access towards crossborder trading (Filatotchev et al., 2001). Greater access
provides for a larger potential market beyond the home country (Aulakh et al., 2000). Having a larger
potential market provides the opportunity to select better customers; this opportunity should lower the actual
cost of negotiations and transactions. Also, this should lower production costs due to higher (or steady)
volumes. Second, freemarket institutional frameworks allow for greater information access (Kriauciunas &
Kale, 2006). This greater access allows domestic firms to select customers more effectively as well as better
target their products or services. This benefit should provide the opportunity to select better customers, which
should lower the actual cost of negotiations and transactions. Better targeting of products or services should
lower production costs since the product may require less customization. Third, foreign customers who
avoided buying from countries with lessdeveloped institutions (either by choice or domestic laws) may now
become customers, providing the firm with a greater range of possible target markets (Bilkey & Nes, 1982;
Pappu, Quester, & Cooksey, 2007). The impact from this greater range is the same as having a broader
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market. The mechanism, however, is not only of firms searching out customers, but also of customers
searching out firms as suppliers. Fourth, freemarket institutional frameworks are characterized by fewer
bureaucratic controls (Makhija, 2003; Svejnar, 2002). Fewer controls reduce the costs of exchange with
foreign customers, as the number of approvals goes down and time to cross borders decreases (Gelbuda,
Meyer, & Delios, 2008). Given the combined impact of lower costs of exchange and production, we predict:

Hypothesis 1: The more developed the country’s institutions, the greater the firm’s export growth.

Strength of Aspirations
We now examine how strength of aspirationi may impact export growth. Aspiration levels are important
because “aspiration levels have behavioral consequences” (Greve, 1998: 80). Aspiration level consequences
deserve attention in transitional economies because managers in Communist firms were historically unable to
choose their strategies. Rather, central planning agencies were responsible for such choices (Makhija, 2003;
Peng & Heath, 1996). Although aspiration levels are recognized as being constructed by comparison with past
performance or comparison to the performance of others (Greve, 2002), a different approach may be needed in
transition economies. In such economies, a firm’s past performance and the performance of others may be
uncertain predictors of aspiration level or strength given the dynamic institutional environment. Greve (1998,
2002) also posits that aspiration levels generally assume a high commitment to the aspiration performance
level. However, it has been argued that “a person who is committed to a goal will try harder to achieve it than
if he is not” (Salancik, 1977: 27). Therefore, commitment (or strength) may be important as a determinant of
behavior, as it refers to the organizational determination to reach an aspiration performance level (Locke,
Latham, & Erez, 1988). For these reasons, we focus not on level of aspirations, but strength of aspirations
for export growth.
Within the aspiration strength perspective, we follow Cavusgil and Nevin (1981: 114) who, based on
Cyert and March’s (1963) concepts, considered the “strength of managerial aspirations for various business

8

goals.” They argue that the importance the decision maker places on the achievement of a goal is a direct
determinant of organizational behavior. Their empirical results regarding the determinants of export marketing
behavior found strong support for this relationship. As the primary decision makers in firms, managers are
expected to lead organizational change. “Adaptation theories of organizational action hold that organizational
change reflects the decisions and strategic shifts of organizational leaders and dominant coalitions” (Haveman,
1993: 20). Peng and Heath (1996: 498) call these shifts by top managers, ‘strategic choices’. In an overview
of previous studies, Bilkey (1978) identified managerial apathy as an important constraint to not initiating
exports since strategic choices were not actively made. Gripsrud (1990) indirectly considered this issue and
found a positive relationship between attitudes and export growth. While few researchers have studied
aspirations with regard to exports, Cavusgil and Nevin (1981), as well as Cavusgil and Naor (1987), have
shown a positive relationship in the strength of managerial aspiration for firm growth on the likelihood of
exporting.
We go beyond previous studies to see if the strength of aspiration has an impact on export growth. We
argue that higher strength of aspiration for exports will promote organizational action to achieve that
performance aspiration. If an organization must make changes to accomplish an objective or adapt to a new
environmental situation, it is likely that multiple changes will be required. If an organization has numerous
goals, not all the goals can be given top priority simultaneously (Cyert & March, 1963). Strength of aspiration
should be directly related to the focus and effort level of the organization toward a specific goal (Cavusgil &
Nevin, 1981). The converse should also be true. Low aspiration strength will reflect low levels of goal
importance and thus low levels of implementation (Locke et al., 1988). Since growing exports requires
organizational change and competes with other changes, the stronger the firm’s aspiration for exports the
higher the likelihood of the organization giving such change full effort and high priority. Aspirations are
important as well since they may go beyond the stated goals of an organization. One can understand them as
the internalized goals of the organization that also encompass prioritization. We accordingly posit a positive
effect between aspiration strength and export growth:
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Hypothesis 2a: The greater the strength of aspiration for export growth, the greater the firm’s export
growth.

The behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963) suggests that the desire to achieve goals should
instigate strategic changes or action within the organization. These managerial actions to change performance
are expected to be fulfilled when institutions support the firm’s actions. This is the underlying premise of
Hypothesis 2a – developed institutional frameworks allow managers to have authority over the firms
they manage and the empowerment to implement their strategic desires. In institutional environments that
have not evolved towards encouraging managerial initiative, this prediction is expected to be weakened.
The central planning process of the Communist system was driven by adherence to a production plan to
meet domestic needs (Makhija, 2003). Profits were not the driving force behind decisionmaking and
revenue calculations were artificial (Gregory & Stuart, 1990; Peng & Heath, 1996). Options for
implementing aspirations, especially as they related to growth, were at best limited. The ‘production
plan’ determined what actions managers should take. Other lessdeveloped institutional contexts, even if
not driven by central government planning, are characterized by greater government involvement or
constraints to managerial decision making (Oliver, 1991). Thus, due to the government involvement in
the economy in lessdeveloped institutional frameworks, we argue that the impact of strength of
aspiration on export growth will be lower relative to firms operating in moredeveloped institutional
frameworks. This is because government involvement limits managers’ ability to implement their
choices. Also, government planning is slower to react to opportunities at the firm level. These arguments
suggest that in lessdeveloped environments a manager’s ability to achieve higher export growth will be
dampened. We therefore predict a moderated relationship between strength of aspiration for exports and
growth in exports for firms operating in lessdeveloped institutional frameworks:
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Hypothesis 2b: In lessdeveloped institutional frameworks, the positive relationship between strength of
aspiration for export growth and the firm’s export growth will weaken.

Private Ownership
We next examine how private ownership may impact export growth. Firms may be privately owned
because they were founded as private firms or because they had been privatized. In privatization, portions of
or entire firms (also called state owned enterprises – SOEs) were sold by the government to private
investors. Private ownership (either privatized or founded private) is theorized to promote freemarket
behavior and entrepreneurial action (Filatotchev et al., 2001; Zahra, Ireland, Gutierrez, & Hitt, 2000). In this
section, we will argue that private ownership increases export growth, due to the increased control of
owners, (in comparison to bureaucratic government control). This effect is also achieved through the
incentives associated with private ownership.
Ownership of an enterprise generally provides the owners with control of the firm’s actions. State owned
enterprises, by definition, are owned by the government. Government ownership is usually associated with less
risk taking, because there is no (or an incomplete) system for failure (Filatotchev et al., 2001; Kogut &
Zander, 2000). When completely stateowned, a firm’s products, strategies, and core decisions are centrally
controlled by a Ministry or similar government body (Filatotchev et al., 2001; Makhija, 2003). This central
control reduces the speed of decision making. With the introduction of private ownership through
privatization, several changes ensue. Reduced state control and diminished government subsidies require
privatized firms to operate more according to freemarket principles (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000). When a
firm is completely private, the government’s role in controlling the firm through its ownership stake is
eliminated. Elimination of government control provides the firm the flexibility to more quickly take advantage
of opportunities, such as export growth, since government approval is not needed for internal/managerial
decisions. Additionally, managers may be more likely to seek out opportunities since there is a greater
likelihood that the firm will have the chance to implement the opportunity.
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Government ownership provides for lower individual incentives, since the residual value created would go
to the government as the owner. Firms with private ownership are expected to strive for the goals as defined
by the owners, through the use of boards of directors and reward systems, whereas completely state owned
firms generally lack these control mechanisms (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000). The ultimate reward, firm
survival, acts as a greater incentive to privately owned firms than to SOEs, as privately owned firms generally
cannot turn to the government for additional funds to avoid failure. Reducing government ownership also
diminishes or eliminates government constraints to private incentives. The increased private ownership allows
for changes in managerial incentives leading to selfinterested behavior by the owners of the firm (Douma et
al., 2006). Private ownership in a transitioning economy suggests higher incentives for entrepreneurial
behavior than state ownership, since state owned firms retain more of the remnants of Communist central
control and offer few or negative rewards for initiative (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000; Filatotchev et al., 2001).
Incentives are important for export growth, because this type of growth is an uncertain, or at best risky,
undertaking. The incentives allow the owners and managers to retain the benefits from this behavior while
acknowledging that firm failure may result. The incentive of profit is one of the most accepted motivations for
undertaking change (Schumpter, 1934).
The proposed impact on export growth can occur through partial or complete private ownership, though
full privatization will reduce government control the most and provide the greatest incentives and control.
Given the reduced bureaucratic control and increased incentives, we predict a positive relationship between
private ownership and export growth:

Hypothesis 3a: The greater the level of private ownership, the greater the firm’s export growth.

We now build from Hypothesis 3a to incorporate the idea that countries that have not progressed
towards a freemarket system may not have institutions that support private ownership. Recall that the
role of developed institutions is to provide a level playing field for an efficient, market based economy.
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The previous arguments regarding the impact of incentives and control need a freemarket so that the
benefits of incentives and control remain with the private owners. In transitional economies, countries
that have lessdeveloped institutions will reflect the Communist system to a greater extent than countries
that have made greater progess. As previously explained, the Communist system was generally based on
government ownership of productive assets and greater government involvement in the economy (Oliver,
1991, Svejnar, 2002). Exceptions to this were some housing, gardens/small farms, and very small firms
(Spicer, McDermott, & Kogut, 2000). The Communist government’s assets and institutions were
established to support stateowned and statecontrolled enterprises through a central planning system.
In lesstransitioned countries we expect the institutions to be a constraining force for firms with
private ownership, since the institutions are largely geared towards supporting stateowned firms. Thus,
though private ownership may provide greater control over the operations of the firm, the lessdeveloped
institutional framework is expected to reduce the ability of firms to implement their goals of expanding
into international markets. In this way, export growth by private firms is hindered by an established
institutional framework that favors stateowned institutions (cf. Chiaburu, 2006; Makhija, 2003). This
favoritism occurs because the government is both the owner of some enterprises and the creator of the
institutional framework by which all firms will operate. As a result, stateowned firms in less
transitioned countries will remain embedded in the Communist institutions (Newman, 2000). Since the
institutional framework of the Communist system did not favor export growth, institutions that are most
similar to the previous framework are also expected to not favor export growth to the extent of the more
developed institutional frameworks.
Lessdeveloped government institutions generally take a larger portion of profits in taxes and fees,
and create more regulations, dampening the incentives associated with private ownership. Lower
incentives will result in less risktaking, since the risk takers keep less of the benefits that they achieve
(Brockhaus, 1980). As actions to increase export growth are one form of risk taking in transitional
economies, the lower incentives will dampen export growth. The incentives related to survival are also
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different, as privately owned firms that fail are less likely to be assisted by the government. In contrast,
stateowned firms are more likely to be supported to avoid massive layoffs and other negative economic
effects (Peng & Heath, 1996).
Accordingly, stateowned firms are more likely to benefit relative to privatelyowned firms when the
institutions are underdeveloped. This is either due to greater benefits to stateowned enterprises as
institutions favor them, or because the dampening impact on incentives affects privately held firms much
more than SOEs. We expect these benefits to reduce the advantages of private ownership over state
ownership in increasing export growth, leading to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3b: In lessdeveloped institutional frameworks, the positive relationship between private
ownership and the firm’s export growth will weaken.

Inertia
We now move from behavioral factors that may support export growth (strength of aspiration and private
ownership), to consider how inertia, as reflected by size and age, may hinder export growth. To consider this
relationship, we pull upon the structural inertia theory (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Kelly & Amburgey, 1991).
In this framework, inertia can be defined as the continuation of previous behavior or practices of the firm,
creating a resistance to change (Kelly & Amburgey, 1991). This is not to suggest that no change occurs but
rather, that organizational change is slower than the pace of environmental change for high inertia
organizations (Hannan & Freeman, 1984).
Past research indicates that inertia can be either detrimental or helpful to the firm. When a firm needs to
change, organizational inertia will slow the response of firms to the “occurrence of threats and opportunities in
their environments” (Hannan & Freeman, 1984: 151). Hannan and Freeman (1984) explain that managers who
attempt to redesign their organizations are likely to encounter collective opposition. Higher levels of inertia
constrain management options due to more rigid bureaucratic structures (Park & Luo, 2001). Higher levels of

14

inertia are also associated with accumulated internal friction, precedent, and political pacts that impede action
(Baum & Shipilov, 2006). In addition to standardized routines, high inertia organizations also exhibit
institutionalized leadership and power distributions, networks of dependencies and commitments, and
formalized roles and control systems that have been found to lower the probability of change (Baum &
Shipilov, 2006).
In changing environments, inertia can also be a stabilizing force in firms by reducing overreaction (Hannan &
Freeman, 1984; Haveman, 1993). Low levels of inertia should enable responsive action, since such firms are
expected to quickly adapt to uncertain environmental conditions (Haveman, 1993). However, low inertia in a
highvelocity, dynamic environment will be associated with overreaction to opportunities (Wright et al.,
2005). Newman (2000) utilizes the terminology ‘strategic confusion’ in relation to firms that manifest a great
deal of activity with little performance enhancement, particularly during turbulent times. Low inertia is also
characterized by unstable organizational politics (Park & Luo, 2001), by a lack of routines to coordinate
efforts, and by a lack of operational capabilities to deal with international growth. Baum & Shipilov (2006)
argue that low inertia firms will also lack broad bases of influence and endorsement, stable relationships with
important external constituents, and legitimacy in comparison to high inertia firms. To therefore understand the
consequences of inertia, one needs to consider whether the inertia is preventing change or providing stability.
Consideration of the consequences of inertia requires an understanding of the firm’s environment. The
environment of this study, transition economies, evolved from the controlled economies of Central and Eastern
Europe. These economies meet the archetypal definitions of bureaucracies that are known to generate self
reinforcing equilibriums rather than change in step with their environments (Haveman, 1993; Crozier, 1964).
Given the central planning systems of the Soviet institutions, firms were required to implement plans. Even
exports were commonly controlled by export agencies, rather than by the firms, due to the central control of
the economy. Thus, the system in place did not support the identification or implementation of export
opportunities at the firm level. Given that we are interested in the ability to increase exports, inertia is
generally expected to negatively impact the ability of firms in the transitional economies to achieve export
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growth. However, environmental and situational factors may affect the inertia relationship with export growth.
We discuss this possibility next.

Inertia (Size). We first consider how inertia, as indicated by firm size, may impact export growth.
Although both size and age are used as indicators of inertia, we consider them separately. Hannan (1998)
suggested that the two indicators may show different results. Whereas size can increase or decrease, age can
only increase. Also, our own theoretical development indicates that for transitional economies, the two
indicators may behave differently. The differences are related to the fact that while a firm can choose its size,
it cannot choose its age. Additionally; in the Soviet system, the government could choose the firm size. As
such, the two factors may have different implications for the firm.
We begin by considering smaller firms in transitional economies. Smaller firms reflect either low levels, or
a lack of inertia. As indicated earlier, small firms in a highvelocity, dynamic environment will be associated
with overreaction to opportunities (Wright et al., 2005) due to lack of inertia. This overreaction will spread
their limited resources and not allow them to properly implement each opportunity they pursue. Small firms
will lack routines and control systems to select export opportunities and implement them successfully, leading
to ‘strategic confusion’ (Newman, 2000). Small size is also characterized by unstable organizational politics
(Park & Luo, 2001), a lack of routines to coordinate efforts such as exporting, lower legitimacy with export
partners, and by a lack of operational capabilities to deal with international business, all of which will reduce
the ability to grow exports (Baum & Shipilov, 2004).Therefore, small firms lack the stabilizing benefits of
inertia.
In contrast, large firms will reflect a high degree of organizational inertia that will constrain their ability to
take advantage of export opportunities. In large firms, organizational routines are highly embedded, thus reducing
organizational flexibility (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Haveman, 1993). The solidified routines in large firms
make it more difficult for firms to take advantage of opportunities in international markets. Large firms
display reduced entrepreneurial management approaches due to more rigid bureaucratic structures (Park &
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Luo, 2001). Large firm size is also associated with accumulated internal friction, precedent, institutionalized
leadership and power distributions, and political pacts that impede action (Baum & Shipilov, 2004). These
factors lower the probability of change that limits the ability of a firm to increase export growth, as export
business required significant change in a firm’s actions in transitional economies.
In contrast, mediumsized firms will be less hindered by inertia than large firms. They are theorized to
have more flexible or fewer routines, more flexible leadership, fewer power distributions, and fewer formalized
roles and control systems (Baum & Shipilov, 2004). We argue that these characteristics will provide for
greater export growth relative to large firms, since mediumsized firms will be able to make the changes
required to capture opportunities. In comparison to small firms, mediumsized firms are theorized to have
more stability, present greater legitimacy with export partners, have increased operational capabilities, more
stable organizational politics, and better developed routines to address export growth opportunities. We argue
that these characteristics will increase the export growth relative to small firms, due to these firms having
needed core systems. Together, medium levels of inertia provide some stability to the firm, but allow sufficient
flexibility to take advantage of international opportunities in a highvelocity, dynamic environment. This
argument indicates a nonlinear relationship between size and export growth, which is consistent with
Haveman’s (1993) work concerning deregulation in the U.S. savings and loan industry. As a result, we
predict:

Hypothesis 4a: Firm size will be curvilinearly related to the firm’s export growth. Specifically, as firm
size increases, the firm’s export growth will increase and then decrease indicating an inverted Ushaped
relationship.

Hypothesis 4a’s argument is predicated on too little or too much inertia restricting the firm’s ability to
adjust to the environment. We believe the relationship in Hypothesis 4a will change in transitional economies
in which institutions are not yet developed. In transition economies, in which the former Communist
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institutions are starting to be dismantled, but few freemarket institutions are being created, the institutions in
place will continue to primarily reflect the Communist system in practice, if not in name. This creates a
situation in which institutional voids (Khanna & Palepu, 2000) coexist with remnants of the previous
Communist institutional system. The result is a predicted Ushaped relationship between size and export
growth in lessdeveloped institutional frameworks. To understand this relationship, we first discuss the impact
of this framework on the relationship between large firms and export growth.
In lessdeveloped institutional environments, large size is expected to reflect less change within the firms,
due to inertial resistance. Therefore, these large firms will continue to work according to Communist
institutional norms and will reflect higher embeddedness with the minimally changed institutional framework (
Granovetter, 1985; Roth & Kostova, 2003). Governments with lessdeveloped institutional frameworks are
also characterized by a greater involvement in the economy. This involvement is frequently targeted at larger
firms, given their impact on the economy and the historical Soviet emphasis on economies of scale. Larger
firm size will also result in greater government support for the firm’s export activities, since a primary goal of
transition economy governments is employment and revenue growth in larger firms (Park & Luo, 2001).
Institutional support is required, particularly in lessdeveloped environments, to achieve international growth
(Wright et al., 2005). This institutional support manifests in the form of ease to obtain permits, tax
advantages, subsidies, and regulation relief (Makhija, 2003). Thus, institutional support from the minimally
changed (Communist) institutions, would allow large firms to grow exports more than medium and smallsized
firms.
Small firms, in lessdeveloped institutional environments, may not be able to take advantage of the
institutional benefits (permitting ease, tax advantages, subsidies, regulation relief, etc.) offered large firms,
given their small economic and employment impact. However, their smaller size provides them with other
advantages not available to medium and large sized firms. These advantages emerge because in lessdeveloped
transitioning economies, small firms are most likely to be entrepreneurial ventures (Dess, Ireland, Zahra,
Floyd, Janney, & Lane, 2003). Leveraging the arguments of North (1990), Spicer et al. (2000) argue that
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these entrepreneurs may benefit by exploiting opportunities created during institutional change. The
entrepreneurial firms were often formed by preexisting businessmen or government officials who used their
networks, view of the business situation, and knowledge of institutional voids to create firms (Chiaburu,
2006). We argue that these ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ (Chiaburu, 2006) in a lessdeveloped transitioning
economy, given their decision to create a firm, will be cognizant of the institutional constraints and
institutional voids and will restrain from actions that conflict with the institutional framework. Their small size
also allows them to garner less attention from the government (cf. Newman, 2000) which is beneficial when
trying to take advantage of institutional voids. Medium and large sized firms do not share these characteristics
of small firms, as such firms are too big to avoid the attention of institutions and managers. The larger firms
have less ability to take advantage of institutional voids given their lower preponderance towards
entrepreneurial behavior (Park & Luo, 2001). In this way, these institutional entrepreneurs of the small firms
could take advantage of weak rule of law to pursue export opportunities identified through their inherited
relationships with government officials.
In summary, mediumsized firms will be at a disadvantage in lessdeveloped free markets in comparison to
small and large firms, in that they will not gain the full support attracted by large firms, they have changed
more than large firms, and they cannot undertake institutional entrepreneurship activity as effectively as small
firms. We therefore predict:

Hypothesis 4b: In lessdeveloped institutional frameworks, the inverted Ushaped relationship between
firm size and the firm’s export growth will weaken, resulting in a Ushaped relationship.

Inertia (Age). We next consider inertia as reflected by firm age. Age has been traditionally used as a proxy
for inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1984) as time enables entrenchment in bureaucratic systems (Park & Luo,
2001), and history is a determinant of the range of potential strategic behaviors (Kelly & Amburgey, 1991).
Age is correlated with rigid organizational politics, political coalitions, and solidified routines (Baum &
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Shipilov, 2004; Levinthal & March, 1981; Park & Luo, 2001), preventing the firm from adjusting effectively
to the opportunities in export markets. Older firms exhibit reduced entrepreneurial management approaches
due to more rigid bureaucratic structures (Park & Luo, 2001), and political pacts that impede action (Baum &
Shipilov, 2004). In addition to standardized routines, older organizations also exhibit institutionalized
leadership, and formalized roles and control systems that have been found to lower the probability of change
(Baum & Shipilov, 2004). These characteristics hinder a firm’s ability to change. As growing exports is a type
of change, we argue that older firms will have a more difficulties growing their exports relative to younger
firms.
Growing exports requires several skills, including the ability to connect with customers and strong
marketing skills (Cavusgil, & Naor, 1987; Cavusgil, & Zou, 1994). Given the lack of marketing functions in
the Soviet system, inertia related to lack of this skill will have a negative impact on export growth. Further,
Hannan and Freeman (1984) defined marketing strategy and goals as two of the four core aspects of
organizations most subject to inertia.
We believe, though, that age and size may not reflect the same characteristics regarding inertia. Whereas a
firm or a government can choose the firm’s size, they cannot realistically control its age. The result is that the
liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) may have a different impact than liability of smallness with respect
to inertia. Further, as indicated by Hannan (1998), age and size may have different magnitudes of impact on
the firm. As explained, greater age will reflect higher levels of inertia and resistance in adjusting to the
transitional economy environment. The effect of low age, however, will be different than small size. Low age
indicates that the firm was recently created. Stinchcombe’s (1965) theory states that firms are founded to
match their environment. In this way young firms are expected to be best positioned to take advantage of
opportunities available in the transitioning environment. This suggests a linear relationship for age versus the
predicted curvilinear relationship for size.
Given the impact of inertia towards hindering change, and with respect to export growth in particular, we
predict the following:
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Hypothesis 5a: The greater the firm age, the smaller the firm’s export growth.

Hypothesis 5a is based on the idea that inertia will restrict a transitional economy firm’s ability to grow
exports, since the Soviet system, unlike the new economic environment, did not encourage exports. In
Hypothesis 5a we built on the idea that inertia acts as a force to prevent change. We now consider whether this
constraint will hold in lessdeveloped institutional contexts. Previous studies suggest that in lessdeveloped
markets, the institutions will constrain a firm’s internationalization growth (Peng & Heath, 1996). In less
evolved transitional economies, few freemarket institutions have been created. This lack of freemarket
institutions can be expected to hurt export growth for all firms. In our context, though, lack of freemarket
institutions means not a lack of institutions overall, but that the institutions continue to primarily reflect the
Communist system. In these lessdeveloped economies, institutions will favor those firms that reflect the
Communist system due to the well established historical relationships (Peng, 2003). Also, those firms that fit
with the institutions will be able to operate more effectively within the constraints of the given institutions, as
they have a better understanding of the institutional environment’s requirements and limits. Hannan (1998)
refers to this concept of fit as alignment between a firm and the demands of its external environment. Although
he notes that inertial forces may restrict a firm’s ability to realign with its new environment, inertial forces
may also prevent a firm from overadjusting to what managers believe will be the future institutional
framework. The support and fit arguments are predicted to extend towards various business decisions
requiring institutional support, such as increasing exports. We predict that older firms will have the best fit
with the minimally changed institutions in lessdeveloped institutional frameworks. Older firms are expected to
exhibit less change within the firms, due to inertial resistance. In relation to the initial discussion on inertia, the
inertia will act like a stabilizing force to prevent firms from acting in advance of the institutional evolution.
Therefore, these older firms will continue to work according to Communist institutional norms. Thus, higher
inertia (as reflected by age) will be beneficial to firms in this environment. In contrast, low age will not only
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reflect low inertia, but also may reflect a lack of legitimacy and a lack of relationship with the institutions.
While young firms, founded recently, may match the current environmental situation (Stinchcombe, 1965), the
lessdeveloped institutional environment requires relationships and legitimacy that require time to establish. As
a result, young firms will not be as readily able to take advantage of opportunities that require institutional
support. The integration of these arguments suggests a linear relationship with export growth being higher for
older firms. We therefore predict:

Hypothesis 5b: In lessdeveloped institutional frameworks, the negative relationship between firm age
and export growth will weaken.

We have predicted that institutional development levels, managerial aspirations, and private ownership
will support export growth, that size will have an inverted Ushape relationship, and firm age will impede
progress in export growth. Furthermore, we argue that the level of institutional development will moderate the
impact of aspirations, ownership, size, and age across different transitioning economies.

DATA AND METHODS
This analysis is based on a novel data set developed through a survey of firms in four transitional
economy countries: Belarus, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Ukraine. Transition economies are countries in Central
and Eastern Europe that experienced a Soviettype central planning regime through 1990, but have since
moved towards a marketbased economy, with weakened bureaucratic control and an introduction of wide
spread private ownership (Peng & Heath, 1996; Svejnar, 2002). The countries have undertaken different
transition approaches with varying degrees of progress to privatization, government reform, and development
of a freemarket economy. The four countries were selected to provide a wide variance in institutional
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development. These countries were in different stages of progress toward European Union accession, with
Lithuania and Bulgaria expecting earlier admittance. These countries represent both the northern and southern
part of the region. At the start of the transition process, these four countries were at similar levels of
institutional development. However, at the time of the study, they reflected a wide variance for the region
regarding institutional development, especially for those countries that had not experienced war (e.g. former
Yugoslavia).
A target sample of 1662 nonfinancial firms in the four countries  300 from Belarus, 350 from Ukraine
and approximately 500 each from Lithuania and Bulgaria  was created using an initial list of firms using the
Amadeus database developed by Bureau Van Dyck. This list was checked and updated using local sources.
The exception to this process was the work in Belarus, since the country is not part of the Amadeus database.
A cooperating research partner had a database of 5000 Belarus companies from which 300 firms were
randomly selected. This approach for developing a random sample has been used in transition economies when
established databases are not available (Filatotchev et al., 2000; Filatotchev et al., 2001).
The survey instrument was based on interviews with managers in Lithuania, Ukraine, and Bulgaria in
October 2001. It examined four areas of operation identified as important to firms in the region  quality
assurance systems, human resource management, marketing, and technology – with a parallel set of questions
examining each of the four areas. To address language issues, the survey was translated from English into the
particular foreign language and then backtranslated into English (Filatotchev et al., 2000; May, Stewart, &
Sweo, 2000). The original English version was compared with the doubletranslated version to identify and
resolve any issues. The survey was pretested prior to largescale launch with no issues identified.
One difficulty with surveys in transitional economies is that information was concentrated in a few
individuals in the firm (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000). As a result, this survey relied on one
qualified person or a small set of qualified individuals in each firm to provide the required data. This is
consistent with prior survey research in similar contexts (Lyles & Baird, 1994; May et al., 2000; Zander &
Kogut, 1995). The survey was sent to the senior director of the firm and requested that s/he identify the person
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who would be the most appropriate respondent to provide information pertaining to each area (Hoskisson et
al., 2000). Since the survey was divided into four sections, the appropriate specialist could complete each
section. On average, two respondents participated in completing each survey, thus reducing singlerespondent
bias.
Survivor bias was tested by comparing firm size for the top 500 firms in each country for 1997 and 2001.
The average firm size increased in Ukraine (p<0.01), and decreased in Bulgaria (p<0.05) and Lithuania
(p<0.01). These trends may be capturing different transition effects. For Lithuania and Bulgaria, there may
have been continued restructuring occurring within firms, whereas for Ukraine, a consolidation among the
firms may have been occurring. As such, there was no consistent pattern regarding survivor bias. Any
survivor bias, though, should result in more conservative results, since firm failure should reduce differences
across firms. For nonresponse bias, we compared firm size (number of employees) of the respondents against
the group that received the survey, but did not respond (Armstrong & Overton, 1977; McEvily & Zaheer,
1999) using a ttest. This was done for Bulgaria and Lithuania, the two countries for which we had data on
respondents and nonrespondents (Ukraine and Belarus were of less concern given their high response rates).
The results indicate that nonrespondents were smaller than respondents (Lithuania: p<0.05; Bulgaria:
p<0.10). Given the use of size for some of the hypotheses, this nonresponse bias will result in more
conservative results – decreasing the ability to show predicted curvilinear relationships from Hypothesis 4. We
discuss these implications further in the discussion section regarding Hypothesis 4b.
In total, 601 usable surveys were returned, for a 36.2% response rate. The response rate by country was
Belarus (83.3%), Bulgaria (16.8%), Lithuania (19.3%), and Ukraine (79%). We adjust for the different
response rates in our regression analysis as explained in the Methods section. The response rate for Lithuania
and Bulgaria compares favorably with the average response rates typically observed for mailbased surveys in
transitional economies (Hoskisson et al., 2000). The significantly higher response rates for Belarus and
Ukraine reflect the use of facetoface interviewers rather than a mailbased survey to collect the data, as
managers in these countries did not want to participate in mailbased surveys ii (Filatotchev et al., 2000;
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Filatotchev et al., 2001). These interviews were structured and involved completing the same survey that was
used in all countries. Influential outliers in the dataset were removed to improve the reliability of the resulting
model. Specifically, two firms were removed. One firm had a founding age of 428 years, with the next closest
firm at 142 years, and one firm had employment of 31,000, with the next closest firm under 11,000 employees
– these two firms overly influenced the results and were outside of the scope of the model. Observations with
missing data were also removed from the data set to bring the final sample size to 473.

Measures
The measures for our research study are shown in Table 1 and are described in the ensuing paragraphs.
[Insert table 1 about here]

Dependent Variable
Export Growth. To measure export growth, we calculated the change in the percentage of sales that came
from exports over a two year period. This information was reported on the survey instrument. Exports are one
of the initial steps towards internationalization, they are easily measurable, and applicable to both large and
small firms (Cavusgil, 1982; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Sullivan, 1994). Also, for our context, exports
required a change in how the firms operated (Cavusgil, & Naor, 1987; Filatotchev et al., 2001) and export
growth was important to these economies. From 1993 to 1999, merchandise exports as a percent of GDP fell
in all four countries and all of the countries except Bulgaria had a negative trade balance in each of these
years. Although a negative trade balance was expected for these economies, the ability of firms to change their
export levels was an important goal at the government and firm level in 1999.
Our measure subtracts the 1999 export percent of sales from the 2001 export percent of sales. The
correlation between the export growth measure and the initial measurement point is extremely low at 0.057.
This indicator value increases our confidence in the appropriateness of the export growth measure (Bergh &
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Fairbank, 2002). Approximately 38% of the firms in the sample had export business in 2001, 23% of the
firms increased their exports over our period of study, and 9% dropped their export level.

Independent Variables
Level of Institutional Development. The level of institutional development variable (H1, H2b, H3b, H4b,
H5b) quantifies the level of business freedom in the economic environment. The measure attempts to capture
the differences across the countries in the study regarding their development of freemarket institutions that
result from the transitions occurring at different rates (Svejnar, 2002). To measure this variable, we used the
Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom measures (www.heritage.org) for 19992001. The measures
are on a 100 point scale, with higher numbers indicating greater economic freedom. These measures,
calculated annually, capture nine characteristics that reflect a country’s adherence to freemarket principles:
business freedom, trade freedom, monetary freedom, freedom from government, fiscal freedom, property
rights, investment freedom, financial freedom, and freedom from corruption iii. Trade policy (now called trade
freedom), had the potential for endogeneity with our dependent variable, export growth. Thus, we recalculated
the index by removing the trade policy component of the score and averaging the remaining eight parameters
over the three year period of interest: 19992001iv. The resulting scores for each country were 59.9 for
Lithuania, 48.9 for Bulgaria, 42.0 for Ukraine, and 33.1 for Belarus. We utilized these average scores directly
as our measure of the level of institutional development.
Strength of Managerial Aspiration for Exports. Our measure for strength of aspiration for exports
(H2a, H2b) is the average of a seven point Likert scale rating from each of the four functions of the firm:
quality assurance, human resource management, technology, and marketing. Our measure rates the importance
of firm specific actions and is based on the response to the survey instrument. This retrospective measure,
regarding actions taken, is consistent with Salancik’s (1977) argument that action is the ultimate proof of
commitment and as such is an accurate measurement of commitment (Locke et al., 1988). Following Cavusgil
& Nevin (1981), the survey asked the respondents to indicate the importance of increasing exports as a reason
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for implementing change to <their functional area> from January 1999 to December 2001. Incorporating
responses across the four organizational functions helps to ensure a measure that reflects a widely held
aspiration of the firm. In cases where less than four responses were received, the measure is based on the
responses that were given. If no responses were provided across any of the four functions, then that firm was
dropped from the analysis. The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure was 0.93.
Private Ownership. To measure private ownership (H3a, H3b), we calculated the average percent
privately owned over a three year period  from 1998 to 2000 using  end of year data. This time frame is one
year in advance of our evaluation period, given the expected lagged impact of private ownership regarding
export growth (Filatotchev et al., 2001). This information was reported on the survey instrument.
Size. We used the number of employees to measure size (H4a, H4b), as revenue is not a consistent
measure in transitional economies, due to currency changes and inflation levels (Baum & Wally, 2003;
Hoskisson et al., 2000). We used the three year average number of employees based on end of year data, one
year in advance of our evaluation period  from 1998 to 2000 (Filatotchev et al., 2001; Hitt, Dacin, Levitas,
Arregle, & Borza, 2000). We utilized the natural logarithm of the number of employees (Baum & Wally,
2003) as the distribution is skewed in our data set.
Age. To measure age (H5a, H5b), we subtracted the date of firm founding from the year 2002. Firms
founded in 2000 or 2001 were deleted from consideration due to incomplete data in our time period of interest.
We utilized the natural logarithm of age (Douma et al., 2006) as the distribution is skewed.
Control Variables. We control for seven variables given their possible impact on export growth. Export
experience is an ‘initial export’ dummy which allows us to control for whether a firm did or did not have
export sales at the start of our evaluation period. Presence or absence of exports may indicate different firm
capabilities and knowledge needed for export growth (Filatotchev et al., 2001; Lages, Jap, & Griffith, 2008).
We measure export experience with a dummy variable indicated by: 1 = nonzero export percentage in
1999 and 0 = zero export percentage in 1999. Foreign ownership may impact firm performance in different
ways than domestic private ownership, since foreign owners may have broader networks and experience with
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international trade (Filatotchev, et al., 2001). Past research has indicated that foreign ownership is important
in privatized firms in Central and Eastern European countries (Filatotchev et al., 2001; Frydman, Gray,
Hessel, & Rapaczynski, 1999). Our measure of private ownership includes foreign ownership; however, we
control for foreign ownership as it may have differential effects. We measured foreign ownership by averaging
end of year foreign ownership percentages, one year in advance of our evaluation period  from 1998 to 2000
(Filatotchev et al., 2001). The founding environment can influence future growth of firms (Stinchcombe,
1965; Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006). We control for this with a dummy variable indicating 1 = founded
before 1990 and 0 = founded in 1990 or later. We control for broader national economic factors in two
ways. First, domestic demand may affect export growth since increasing domestic sales is a clear alternative to
increasing exports. We measured domestic demand growth as GDP growth (Coccari, 1978; Bevan, Estrin, &
Meyer, 2004). We used the average growth in country GDP between 1999 and 2001 from the EBRD – The
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (www.ebrd.com). Second, the level of country export
growth may affect firms’ export growth performance. We evaluated country export growth using the EBRD
data that reports total country export sales by year (www.ebrd.com). Our measure is a ratio of the difference
between 1999 and 2001 divided by the 1999 value. Firm resources may also affect the level of export growth.
Firms that possess research and development capability are known to have a higher likelihood of capturing
new opportunities (Jaffe, 1986) and to have a higher market credibility that may affect capability to grow
export business. We control for this with R&D density which is measured as number of employees in R&D
divided by the total number of employees (Helfat, 1997). To operationalize R&D density, we calculated this
ratio by averaging end of year values, one year in advance of our evaluation period  from 1998 to 2000
(Filatotchev et al., 2001). We control for industry using four categories: ‘service’ (wholesale, retail),
‘processing’ (light industry, heavy industry, food processing), ‘capital intense’ (utilities, chemicals,
petroleum), and ‘other’ (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). Rather than using dummy variables, the survey respondents
indicated the percentage of revenue from each of the industry sectors. For each of the categories, the
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contribution of the particular industrial category to the firm’s revenues is measured on a 0% to 100% scale.
This allows for a finer analysis of the impact of industry on the overall results.

Methods
We utilized a weighted least squares regression analysis to test our hypotheses. In order to reduce the
multicollinearity of the squared and the interacted terms, we mean centered the appropriate variables (Aiken
& West, 1991) utilizing the “PROC STANDARD” procedure in SAS version 9.1 Statistical Analysis
Software. In order to account for the variation in response rates across countries given their relative size, we
utilized the “PROC SURVEYREG” procedure in SAS version 9.1. We adjusted the country strata weights
based on the population of each country in 2002 (Heston, Summers, & Aten, 2006) in relation to the number
of observations in each strata (country) v.
The choice of a firm to export may indicate an endogenous managerial choice or it may indicate different
firm capabilities. If the latter, it may not be a choice at all but rather the result of a failed export growth
attempt. Our data includes firms that had growth, decline, or remained unchanged. Our data also includes
firms that did not have exports initially (1999) as well as those that did have exports. We could discard the
nonexporting firms, but this would bias our regression parameter estimates. Firms that were nonexporters
initially could provide meaningful information, as some may have aspired to export but were unable to do so,
some may have not aspired to export, and some may have achieved some level of export growth. Therefore, we
first tested for differences in the exporter/nonexporter dichotomy using a Chow test (Chow, 1960). This was
accomplished using the “AUTOREG” Procedure in SAS version 9.1 Statistical Analysis Software. The Chow
test confirmed that the groups were significantly different, with pvalue comparisons significant at 0.01 or
better for all models tested. This indicates that some type of selection treatment was required for the exporters
versus the nonexporters. Therefore, we used a procedure that combines both exporters and nonexporters to
produce unbiased estimates of the regression parameters (Graen et al., 2006). We utilized our dummy control
variable for export experience as an interaction term to statistically capture this difference. This provides us
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with five models; Model 1 includes only the control variables, Model 2 adds the variables of interest to create
a full model, Model 3 adds the export experience doubleinteractions, Model 4 adds the institutional
development doubleinteractions without the export experience interactions, and Model 5 includes all the
variables, doubleinteractions, and tripleinteractions. In this way, the interaction terms with the variable
export experience allow us to evaluate the differences in firm behavior as a function of the firm’s starting
export performance.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The means, standard deviations, and correlations for all variables are reported in Table 2. We utilized
variance inflation factor analysis (using OLS regression without stratification) to check the possibility of
collinearity issues among the variables (Aiken & West, 1991). No variables indicated scores over 10, with the
highest score being 9.47, suggesting no concerns. As a secondary test of the collinearity between the variables
age and founding environment which had 86 percent of their variance in common, we ran the models with the
founding environment variable removed. All major findings were preserved vi. Therefore; given the stability of
the results and the specification error that would result from dropping the founding environment variable, we
maintained this control variable in our models. The results of the regression models are shown in Table 3 and
explained in the following paragraphs.
[Insert Table 2 & 3 about here]
Model 1 contains only control variables. The export experience dummy variable and R&D density are
both positive and significant as would be expected. The coefficients for process industry and service industry
are negative and significant. The negative coefficients indicate these industries are less likely to be associated
with increases in export levels as compared to the capital intensive and the ‘other’ industry categories. Also,
we observe that the foreign ownership control variable is not statistically significant in any of our models.
The hypotheses use export growth as the dependent variable. As such, our theory primarily focused on
firms that had exports at the start of our observation period. Although the underlying ideas may also be

30

appropriate for firms that were not exporting, we believe that managerial behavior and inertia for firms that
begin to export are likely to be different than those that are trying to increase exports (cf. Haveman, 1993).
Thus, coefficients related to variables that were interacted with export experience are most appropriate for
interpreting our results.
Models 2 and 3 contain the results to examine hypotheses 1, 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a. We first test Hypothesis 1 that
predicts the institutional development level will have a positive relationship with export growth. The
coefficient for institutional development, although positive in both models, is not significant; therefore
Hypothesis 1 is not supported. Hypothesis 2a predicted a positive relationship between strength of aspiration
for exports and export growth. The coefficients of 1.01 in Model 2 and 0.44 in Model 3 are positive and
significant (p<0.01, p<0.05 respectively), indicating strong support for Hypothesis 2a. Furthermore, in Model
3 the coefficient of 2.59 for the exportaspiration interaction is significant (p<0.01). This interaction
relationship of Model 3 is graphically depicted in Figure 2 and suggests that the aspirationsgrowth
relationship is stronger for firms that had export experience. Hypothesis 3a states that private ownership levels
will have a positive relationship with export growth. In Model 2, the coefficient (0.02) is positive and
significant (p<0.10), as predicted, providing some support for Hypothesis 3a. However, the main effect
coefficient (0.01) and the exportprivate interaction coefficient (0.05) in Model 3 are not significant. This
model suggests that export experience does not influence the private ownershipexport growth relationship.
Hypothesis 4a states that firm size will have an inverted Ushaped relationship with export growth. The
coefficients for size and size squared are not significant in Model 2; however, in Model 3 the exportsize
interaction coefficient (2.97) is negative and significant (p<0.10). The size squared coefficient (0.48) is not
significant. This means that size has a negative linear relationship with export growth for firms that had export
experience, which is different than predicted. Hypothesis 5a states that firm age will be negatively related to
export growth. The coefficient for age in Model 2 (0.01) is negative, but not significant. In Model 3, the
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exportage interaction is not significant. Therefore, neither inertiabased hypothesis is supported in these
models; however, we shall reconsider these hypotheses in Models 4 and 5.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Model 4 adds the interactions of institutional development with each of the main variables. Model 5 adds
the export interactions and the tripleinteractions of exports and institutions with our main variables of
interest. Recall that with the Heritage Foundation data, higher institutional development levels indicate more
developed institutional environments and the export experience dummy is valued at 1 for firms with export
experience in the initial period. The relationships in Hypotheses 2b, 3b, 4b, and 5b predicted a weakening of
the relationships in lessdeveloped environments. Therefore, positive coefficients on the interacted aspiration,
private ownership, and size squared terms will be consistent with our hypotheses, as will a negative coefficient
on the interacted size and age terms. This applies to both double and triple interactions.
Hypothesis 2b predicted a weakened relationship between strength of aspiration for exports and export
growth. The coefficient for the interaction terms of institutions and aspirations in Model 4 (0.05) is not
significant. Also, in Model 5 the coefficients for institutionaspiration (0.002) and for exportaspiration
institution (0.13) are not significant, indicating a lack of support for Hypothesis 2b. Hypothesis 3b predicted a
weakened relationship between private ownership and export growth. In Model 5 the coefficient on the export
privateinstitution interaction is negative (0.01) and significant at p<0.05. These tripleinteraction
relationships are graphically depicted in Figures 3a and 3b for firms with and without export experience.
Hypothesis 3b is partially supported as the predicted relationship holds for firms which did not have export
experience but is opposite of our prediction for firms which had export experience. This means that for firms
that were already exporting, greater private ownership was associated with lower export growth in more
developed institutional frameworks (Figure 3a). For firms that were not exporting, greater private ownership
was associated with higher export growth in more developed institutional frameworks (Figure 3b).
[Insert Figure 3a, 3b about here]
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Hypothesis 4b predicted that size would have a Ushaped relationship with export growth in less
developed institutional environments. The interaction of institutional development with size is negative (0.18)
and significant (p<0.01) in Model 4, with sizesquared interaction not significant. In Model 5, the exportsize
interaction (2.94) is significant (p<0.10) as is the exportsize squaredinstitution interaction (0.12) at
p<0.05. These tripleinteraction relationships are graphically depicted in Figures 4a and 4b for firms with
export experience and without. Therefore, as reflected in Figure 4a, we find support for Hypothesis 4b – size
has curvilinear consequences in a Ushape for the firms with export experience in lessdeveloped institutional
environments. Also in support of Hypothesis 4a, we find an inverted Ushape for moredeveloped institutional
environments. Figure 4b indicates opposite curvilinearity for firms that did not have export experience.
Hypothesis 5b predicted that the negative relation of firm age with export growth of Hypothesis 5a would
weaken in lessdeveloped institutional environments. The coefficient, in Model 4, for the interaction between
institutional development and age is positive (0.30) and significant (p<0.10). This interaction relationship is
graphically depicted in Figure 5. The age relationship does not show a significant interaction with export
experience, therefore only the significant and highest level interaction graphs are presented. These results
suggest that age is an asset in moredeveloped institutional frameworks, counter to both our Hypothesis 5b and
Hypothesis 5a.
[Insert Figure 4a, 4b, 5 about here]
Overall, our models indicate that the level of institutional development, when interacted with private
ownership, size, sizesquared, and age, is significant in explaining export growth. The strength of aspiration
for exports was important in all the models but was not significant when interacted with institutional
development level. The significant interactions with export experience indicate that aspirations, private
ownership, size, and sizesquared relationships change as a function of prior export experience. Since the
variables for the primary relationships in Models 4 and 5 have been meancentered, the interaction variables
leave the main effects to reflect values conditional on the institutional development level being at its mean. Due
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to the complexity of triple interaction interpretation, the graphed relationships are provided to assist
interpretation.

DISCUSSION
The goal of this study was to examine the direct and indirect impact of institutions on growth in firm
exports. We began by predicting a positive relationship between the institutional development level and export
growth. We did not find support for this prediction, which is quite surprising given past research on the impact
of institutions (Makino et al., 2004; Roth & Kostova, 2003). For example, Makino et al. (2004) found that
the impact of institutions on firm performance was twice as great in emerging nations as in developed nations.
However, our results may be due to the desire of both moredeveloped and lessdeveloped economies for
export growth as exports can increase job creation, improve balance of trade, and provide for economic
growth. These improvements would be welcomed by both moredeveloped and lessdeveloped economies.
The finding that foreign ownership, a control variable, was not significant in any of our models was
unexpected. Past research has indicated that foreign ownership is important in privatized firms in CEE
(Filatotchev et al., 2001; Frydman, Gray, Hessel, & Rapaczynski, 1999). We suggest four potential reasons
for this lack of significance. First, the population of firms with foreign ownership was small (~12%) at the
time of our study, with many firms having only minority foreign ownership. Second, our private ownership
variable and the foreign ownership variable, while not collinear, are significantly related, as every firm with
foreign ownership also has some portion privately owned by our measurement approach. This could lead to
the lack of significance in the foreign ownership variable (note that private ownership was significant at the
p<0.10 level). Third, foreign ownership may have differential effects across institutions and export experience.
Just as strength of aspirations and private ownership need a conducive institutional framework, so too foreign
ownership may need a particular institutional framework. Fourth, foreign ownership has been argued to be a
multidimensional construct and as such may not directly correlate to control. Foreign ownership may or may
not indicate degree of control, resource contribution, or scope of control (areas of the operation where control
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is exercised) (Karhunen, Löfgren, & Kosonen, 2008). This is an area deserving of future detailed
investigation.
In testing Hypothesis 2a, we found that the strength of aspiration has a positive impact on export growth.
The importance of this finding becomes clear in Hypothesis 2b, which predicted that in lessdeveloped
institutional environments, the relationship between aspirations and export growth would weaken. We did not
find a significant difference, suggesting that even in a lessdeveloped institutional environment, strategic
managerial action is positively related to export growth. This finding supports Peng & Heath’s (1996)
proposition that posits firm growth will be driven by the strategic choice for growth adopted by top managers.
Our results may be further understood by considering mechanisms through which institutions influence firms
indirectly via managerial behavior. Institutions, through government policies, can impact managerial attitudes
towards business decisions, as indicated by various export promotion and education programs. This
relationship may indicate that institutional environments can impact managerial aspiration strength as well. In
our sample, the average aspiration strength level on a seven point scale was: Lithuania (5.0), Bulgaria (4.1),
Ukraine (3.6), and Belarus (3.3). Ttests indicate that the mean for Lithuania is significantly different from the
other countries and Bulgaria is significantly different from Belarus (p<0.10 with a Bonferroni correction).
These averages are consistent with the ordering of the level of freemarket development, therefore we conclude
that institutions affect the level of export growth aspired by managers. This effect on managerial orientation is
consistent with Makhija and Stewart (2002), who found that managers in freemarket environments had higher
comfort with uncertainty than managers from planned institutional environments. However, the lack of a
significant interaction with a highly significant main effect suggests that firms with high aspiration strength
were still able to achieve export growth irrespective of the institutional constraints. So, institutions appear to
constrain the desire to increase export levels and not to affect the ability to do so for those who maintained
high aspirations in the face of potential institutional constraints. These results imply that, ceteris paribus,
strong managerial aspirations can result in increased export growth even in a lessdeveloped transitioning
economy.
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Hypothesis 3a considered the relationship between private ownership and export growth. Private
ownership had a moderately significant, positive maineffect relationship. Just as managerial aspirations can
impact a firm’s actions, the incentives and managerial control associated with private ownership appear to
provide the expected positive effect regarding export growth, irrespective of the institutional constraints.
However, the relationships are quite complex, as we can see in the unexpected tripleinteraction effects. We
believe these results can be explained by considering the limits of the influence of institutions on the incentives
and control of private ownership. In our sample, the average private ownership percentage was: Lithuania
(85.5%), Bulgaria (81.1%), Ukraine (78.9%), and Belarus (77.0%). Since Ttests indicated no statistical
difference for these averages, we are cautious in our conclusions. However, we believe that they suggest that
while institutions may limit the amount of the economy in private hands, they are less adept at preventing
firms from acting on the incentives associated with private ownership. The interaction plots of Figure 3a and
3b suggest the predicted relationship holds for firms which did not have export experience (Figure 3b), but
opposite our prediction for firms which had export experience (Figure 3a). The logic for firms that initiated
export growth without having existing export business in 1999 follows our hypothesis development. These
firms initiated (increased from zero) exports, as foreign sales were viewed as beneficial sources of revenue and
profits. We also note that these firms cannot decrease exports, as they started with no export sales. We believe
the opposite results for firms with previous export experience reflect a different way to improve performance
than export growth. Specifically, in the moredeveloped institutional environments, export growth may not be
the best way to improve profits since the firm may have already come close to an optimal export level. As a
result, if increasing exports is not profitable and given that government support is not expected for export
growth, then export growth is not likely to occur. In lessdeveloped institutional environments, firms with
higher private ownership will still respond to incentives. However, the incentives may be profitability
associated with export growth or they may be related to government support for employment. Firms may have
pursued exports because export growth can provide greater employment levels, especially given the support of
governmental institutions (favorable regulations, subsidies, or other advantages). In consequence, the ‘more is

36

better’ thought process for exports may not be appropriate at this stage for firms in the moredeveloped
institutional environments. Overall, these results suggest that private ownership stimulates both actions for
growth and actions for profit enhancement. Due to the complexity of the relationships observed, we suggest
the conclusion that the incentives and control created by private ownership can overcome institutional
constraints deserves further study. Even though institutions were theorized to constrain the ability to increase
export levels, the benefits of private ownership were observed across our sample of institutional levels.
Accordingly, we conclude that private ownership matters (Filatotchev et al., 2000; Filatotchev et al., 2001).
We predicted an inverted Ushaped relationship between firm size and export growth in Hypothesis 4a,
and a Ushaped relationship in Hypothesis 4b in lessdeveloped institutional environments. We found support
for both of these predictions when firms had export experience (see Figure 4a), but opposite results for firms
that did not possess such experience (see Figure 4b). A potential reason for the inversion of the relationships is
linked to the difference in firm capabilities required to initiate exports without experience. In moredeveloped
environments, small and large firms without export experience have higher export growth than medium sized
firms. This result may be explained if small firms were able to unleash the entrepreneurial spirit suggested by
Zahra et al. (2000) and thus overcome the lack of established routines and strategic confusion. For large firms,
this result may be related to size reflecting other characteristics of the firm besides inertia, such as higher
levels of slack, market power, customer credibility, and scale economies (Haveman, 1993; Park & Luo, 2001;
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). These characteristics may lead to larger firms having greater ability to initiate
export growth with international customers. In contrast, for firms in lessdeveloped environments without
export experience, export growth was about zero and size did not have a significant relationship with export
growth. This means that firms that were not exporting in 1999 were not successful in initiating and then
growing exports. Given this is occurring in a lessdeveloped institutional environment, lack of permits or
second mover disadvantages with respect to working with institutions may explain this result. As explained in
the Methods section, there may be an underrepresentation of small and medium sized firms. Although that
underrepresentation has not diminished our ability to identify a curvilinear relationship, if these firms did not
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have exports in 1999, then their absence may contribute to our inability to identify a sizeexport growth
relationship for this subset of firms.
Hypothesis 5a, which predicted that firm age would be negatively related to export growth, was not
supported. Hannan (1998) suggests that there are inconsistencies in age effects in organizational research and
that the level of volatility in the environment may reverse the relationships. In our case, with multiple
institutional environments and very dynamic economies we may be observing this type of volatility regarding
age. However, in Hypothesis 5b, we predicted a negative interaction of institutional development and firm age.
We found a statistically significant, positive coefficient for the interaction, which is graphically shown in
Figure 5. This result, opposite of our prediction, suggests that age is an asset when institutions are more
developed and a liability when they are not. Furthermore, age did not have a significant interaction with export
experience unlike the other main variables. This interesting result may be explained by institutional
embeddedness for older firms. Older firms in lessdeveloped environments may be laden with inertia as
previously explained. This agerelated inertia and embeddedness in the historical institutions may become
higher with time irrespective of the level of export experience. With age, though, a firm may develop
capabilities to undertake change (Kelly & Amburgey, 1991). This capability to change could be unleashed
with the developing of freemarkets. Once again, this capability would exist with or without export experience,
as there is no a priori reason to expect a relationship between age and export experience. Given the variables
of interest in our study, this capability came into play through export growth.
The contrasting results, when interacting institutional development with age and size, are surprising. Older
firms in moredeveloped institutional environments had higher export growth than younger firms, yet larger
firms in lessdeveloped markets had higher export growth than did mediumsized firms (considering firms that
had export experience). While the size interaction follows our theoretical expectation, age acts in the opposite
direction. Not only is this surprising given our predictions, but many inertia studies have shown that size and
age have a similar impact on the firm (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Kelly & Amburgey, 1991; Zhou et al.,
2006). The results, though, do appear to reflect the refined arguments of Hannan (1998), which suggest age
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and size may not have proportional effects in certain situations. Hannan (1998) suggests that variation in other
factors may impact the age relationship, such as endowments, capabilities, and positional advantages. We
believe that Peng’s (2003) phasedmodel of institutional transition may provide additional insights to our
results. He suggests that the first phase of institutional transition will exhibit a relationshipbased transaction
structure and that this will gradually shift to a rulebased transaction structure. As the countries in our sample
were at different levels of institutional progression, it is possible that the moredeveloped economies in our
sample were operating a more rulebased structure and that the lessdeveloped economies were operating in a
more relationshipbased structure. This would create a situation where larger firms in lessdeveloped
institutional environments with a relationshipbased structure would use their powerful relationships to gain
advantage relative to smaller firms. Similarly, in a rulebased structure, greater age may be an indication of
legitimacy and influence (Baum & Shipilov, 2004), as well as true organizational capability. Youth in a more
developed economy may result in a liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) and an ensuing lack of
legitimacy. Given our dependent variable of export growth, age in moredeveloped economies may be an
indicator for foreign customers of reliability and viability. In contrast, size might be a remnant of the past
regimes that manipulated employment to achieve Communist Party goals. Thus, our results align with Peng’s
(2003) phasedmodel in suggesting that large size acts as a positive indicator in relationshipbased institutional
environments and age acts as a positive indicator in rulebased institutional environments.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This paper’s foundation is comprised of its novel consideration of how inertia changes as institutions
develop, its consideration of managerial aspirations in firms evolving through dynamic change, the unique data
including multiple former Communist countries, and the richness of the firmspecific information that enables
us to test our theoretical model. Nevertheless, this research is not without limitations. First, an important
element of all research is generalizability. Although we focus on CEE countries, we believe our institutional
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development measures and multiindustry sample provides the foundation for generalizability to similar
conditions. Many countries, such as Russia, China, Vietnam, Cuba, and Venezuela, still have strong
government intervention in market operations, with varying degrees of movement towards freemarket
institutions. As these countries move towards or return to freemarket systems, our results should inform them
of the institutional frameworks and managerial strategies that need to be considered to improve growth
through exports.
Second, our data set included only four countries with four resulting levels of institutional development.
Although a positive step from using binary measures, the study could be enhanced by increasing the variance
in the institutional framework measure through a larger sample of countries. Future research should consider
increased crosscountry comparisons. Finally, our study could benefit by distinguishing between firms with
private ownership due to being established private, and private ownership through privatization. Since
privatization does not always involve restructuring or a change in management, the predicted impact of private
ownership may be weakened in privatized firms. Considering this difference could enhance future studies.
In the future, we would like to address foreign ownership. While not significant in any of our analyses, it
is one of the most significant performance factors in previous research (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000). Foreign
ownership may enable firms to overcome inertia faster, especially in an appropriate institutional environment.
In some cases, foreign ownership may result in special incentives and allowances not granted to domestic
owners. We believe that understanding the effect of foreign ownership in transitioning institutional
environments is an important international business topic. A second line of research is to better understand the
impact of management across a broader range of institutional levels. A third area to research is a full set of
internationalization modes (sales offices, manufacturing sites, and foreign employees) across a broader range
of institutional levels. Such research should address the limitations mentioned above while gaining additional
insight regarding the managers, firm strategies, and actions taken over time.
Future researchers should also consider the different types of institutions and their presence and effect at
different levels. We are curious about the possibilities and limits of the effect of institutions on firmlevel
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actions. As many of the countries in the region have changed their institutions to achieve EU membership, it is
worth considering how those changes relate to firm behavior. This includes various macro, national, regional,
and micro aspects of institutions.vii Future researchers should also consider more detailed analysis of export
destination country. Particularly in former Communist countries, it would be helpful to distinguish among
exports to former Communist countries, emerging economies, and developed economies. A richer
understanding of the transition of networks and a more detailed firmlevel understanding of the antecedents to
export growth to various regions could be derived from such a study. We expect that the network of
relationships could be a significant influence on firm performance during major institutional transition. This
could be important, as trade patterns in the region have significantly changed over the past 1015 years. This
type of research could provide several contributions to the international business literature as well as to the
theories regarding institutions and organizational strategic change in dynamic environments.viii

CONCLUSION
These results provide several important contributions to our understanding of institutions and export
growth. First, our results suggest that even in lessdeveloped economies, managerial aspirations and private
ownership matter. This result is a step towards addressing the need cited by Oliver (1997) of examining the
impact of institutions on managerial decisions. The findings also suggest that institutions do not affect
managerial aspirations as much as theory seems to indicate, suggesting limits of institutions in controlling
managerial behavior. Our second contribution is that institutions do impact export growth, through interaction
with private ownership, size and age. This result adds to the understanding of the internationalization of
emerging economy firms (Wright et al., 2005). Third, the contrasting results of the size and age relationships
offer support for Peng’s (2003) phasedmodel of institutional transition. These two seemingly similar variables
may provide different information to export partners when the institutional development level varies. Taken
together, this work highlights the importance of considering the multiple factors that may simultaneously
affect the export growth of firms.
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Past research has indicated that institutions matter (North, 1990; Makino et al., 2004). However, the
effect of institutions may vary in emerging and transitioning economies (Peng & Heath, 1996; Makhija &
Stewart, 2002). This research continues to develop our understanding of the varied direct and indirect impact
of institutions on export growth. We have accomplished this by studying an integrated set of variables
with empirical analyses in the context of transition economies. The results suggest that the factors
impacting export growth need to be considered both individually and jointly. Governments should note
that institutions do matter, although in ways that may be different than they believe. Managers should be
heartened to know that aspirations and incentives associated with private ownership do matter, even in less
developed institutional contexts. Consequently, firms that adapt their strategic aspirations consistent with the
dynamics of the institutional environment and the incentives of private ownership will increase aspiration
accomplishment – in our case, export growth. Therefore, even though institutions matter, managerial actions
can yield substantive results. Institutions and management are both important across different types of
institutional environments.
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TABLE 1
Definition of Export Growth Model Variables

Variable
Dependent
Export Growth
Independent
Institutional Development
Managerial Aspirations
Private Ownership
Size
Size2
Age
Control
Export Experience
Foreign Ownership
Founding Environment
GDP Growth
Country Export Growth
R&D Density
Industry

Description

∆ % Export Sales (20011999)

Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom (without
trade policy component)
Strength of Aspiration for Exports (7point Likert scale)
% Privately Owned (three year average of 20001998)
Natural Logarithm of Number of Employees (average over
three years 20001998)
Square of Size (as above)
Natural Logarithm of Years Since Founding

Firm Export Sales in 1999 Dummy
% Foreign Ownership (three year average 20001998)
Pretransition Founding Date Dummy (pre 1990)
% GDP Growth (20011999)
% Growth in Exports (20011999)
R&D Employees/Total Employees (average 20001998)
Industry Sector (% each in four sectors: processing, service,
capital intensive, other)
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics for Export Growth Model
Variables
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Export Growth
Institutional Development
Aspiration for Exports
Private Ownership
Size (logged)
Age (logged)
Export Experience (dummy)
Foreign Ownership
Founding Environment (dummy)
GDP Growth
Country Export Growth
R&D Density
Process Industry
Service Industry
Capital Intensive Industry
Variables

Mean
2.27
42.10
3.78
79.81
4.91
3.04
0.43
4.29
0.66
4.45
0.33
0.07
42.62
30.22
12.64
6

s.d.

Min.

10.04
8.99
2.30
34.97
1.72
1.02
0.50
16.57
0.47
0.62
0.09
0.15
47.24
43.00
32.46

32.5
33.1
1
0
0.51
1.10
0
0
0
3.14
0.28
0
0
0
0

7

Max.
80
59.9
7
100
9.26
4.96
1
100
1
4.97
0.55
1
100
100
100

8

1

2

3

0.03
0.25*** 0.24***
0.02
0.10**
0.14*** 0.15***
0.09**
0.15***
0.21*** 0.30***
0.01
0.26***
0.07
0.02
0.01
0.77***
0.01
0.77***
0.10**
0.01
0.05
0.09**
0.12*** 0.08**
0.08*
0.08**
9

10

0.02
0.35***
0.28***
0.56***
0.11***
0.18***
0.21***
0.21***
0.04
0.18***
0.26***
0.09**

11

7.
Export Experience (dummy) 0.13***
8.
Foreign Ownership
0.07*
0.17***
9.
Founding Envir. (dummy)
0.86*** 0.05
0.10**
10.
GDP Growth
0.11*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.23***
11.
Country Export Growth
0.08**
0.19*** 0.25*** 0.02
0.83***
12.
R&D Density
0.22*** 0.01
0.04
0.22*** 0.07*
0.01
13.
Process Industry
0.23*** 0.08**
0.05
0.21*** 0.01
0.10***
14.
Service Industry
0.40*** 0.13*** 0.02
0.40*** 0.13*** 0.02
15.
Capital Intensive Industry
0.11*** 0.10** 0.02
0.09**
0.01
0.03
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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4

12

5

0.37***
0.32*** 0.66***
0.01
0.23***
0.11*** 0.07
0.34*** 0.64***
0.09**
0.04
0.09**
0.14***
0.11** 0.35***
0.09**
0.28***
0.14*** 0.47***
0.20*** 0.19***
13

14

0.13***
0.04
0.54***
0.01
0.35*** 0.25***

TABLE 3
Stratified Regression Model Results for Export GrowthA
Variables
Model 1
Intercept
7.72
(18.55)
Institutional Development
Aspiration for Exports
Private Ownership
Size

Model 2
15.64 (22.67)
0.09
(0.11)
1.01*** (0.35)
0.02* (0.01)
0.15
(0.83)

Model 3
21.05 (22.86)
0.05
(0.12)
0.44** (0.19)
0.01
(0.01)
0.78
(0.86)

Model 4
14.41 (22.22)
0.14
(0.17)
1.05*** (0.37)
0.02
(0.01)
0.08
(0.83)

Model 5
18.68 (22.64)
0.003 (0.15)
0.37** (0.19)
0.01
(0.01)
0.79
(0.86)

Size2
Age
Interactions
Institution x Aspiration
Institution x Private
Institution x Size

0.11
0.01

0.19
0.04

0.06
0.01

0.23
0.12

(0.34)
(1.67)

Institution x Size2
Institution x Age
Export x Aspiration
Export x Private
Export x Size
Export x Size2
Export x Age
Export x Aspiration x
Institution
Export x Private x
Institution
Export x Size x Institution

(0.31)
(1.10)

(0.37)
(1.66)

0.05
(0.04) 0.002
0.002 (0.001) 0.001
0.18** (0.08) 0.01

(0.04)
(0.002)
(0.07)

0.01
0.30*
2.59*** (0.99)
0.05
(0.04)
2.97* (1.78)

0.05
0.16**
2.65***
0.04
2.94*

(0.04)
(0.08)
(0.96)
(0.04)
(1.73)

0.48
3.75

0.37
3.12

(0.60)
(2.95)

0.13

(0.08)

(0.04)
(0.17)

(0.59)
(3.22)

0.01** (0.00)
0.20
(0.18)

Export x Size2 x Institution
Export x Age x Institution
Controls
Export Experience
4.73** (2.23)
Foreign Ownership
0.02
(0.05)
Founding Environment
2.13
(1.43)
GDP Growth
0.64
(2.81)
Country Export Growth
8.28
(18.81)
R&D Density
16.88* (8.96)
Process Industry
0.05*
(0.03)
Service Industry
0.05*
(0.02)
Capital Intensive Industry 0.01
(0.04)

1.41
0.03
2.24
1.37
21.56
16.82
0.04*
0.04*
0.03

n
F

514
6.76***

473
5.97***

473
6.09***

473
4.94***

473
4.52***

0.092

0.137

0.177

0.143

0.183

Adjusted R2
A

(0.32)
(1.12)

0.12** (0.05)
0.11
(0.23)
(2.40)
(0.04)
(3.29)
(3.22)
(20.93)
(10.69)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.03)

2.84
0.01
1.53
2.17
28.17
16.30
0.04*
0.03
0.04

(3.27)
(0.04)
(2.95)
(3.33)
(20.75)
(10.10)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)

1.24
0.02
2.30
0.98
23.51
16.55
0.04*
0.04*
0.03

(2.39)
(0.04)
(3.33)
(2.86)
(25.74)
(10.56)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.03)

Sample sizes differ because observations with missing values were omitted.
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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2.40
0.02
1.40
1.69
28.71
15.49
0.04
0.03
0.03

(3.30)
(0.05)
(2.99)
(2.97)
(26.37)
(9.83)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)

FIGURE 1
Export Growth Model
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FIGURE 2
Export Growth versus Aspiration: Interaction with Export Experience
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FIGURE 3a
Export Growth versus Private Ownership: Firms with Export Experience
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FIGURE 3b
Export Growth versus Private Ownership: Firms without Export Experience
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Note: The figure shows export growth versus private ownership at the maximum and the minimum institutional
development levels of our sample set.
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FIGURE 4a
Export Growth versus Natural Logarithm of Size: Firms with Export Experience
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FIGURE 4b
Export Growth versus Natural Logarithm of Size: Firms without Export Experience
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Note: The figures shows export growth versus the natural logarithm of size at the maximum and the minimum
institutional development levels of our sample set.

54

FIGURE 5
Export Growth versus Natural Logarithm of Age: Institutional Development Interaction
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Endnotes:
i

Aspiration strength is analogous to goal importance or goal commitment in the psychology literature.
The sample determination and data collection methods were different across countries as discussed. This was
necessary to simultaneously obtain responses and minimize expenses. We follow the example set by others
(Filatotchev et al., 2001).
iii
A tenth characteristic, labor freedom, was added to the index in 2006, which is after the time period of interest.
iv
Dropping the ‘trade policy’ component did not alter the statistical significance of our independent variables.
v
When country population weighting was not utilized countries with larger sample representation were over
represented.
vi
We note that the relatively high collinearity of the variables will increase the standard errors and reduce the
probability of significant findings.
vii
We appreciate this suggestion from an anonymous reviewer.
viii
We appreciate this suggestion from an anonymous reviewer.
ii
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